had measured certain variables, for whatever reason, that could possibly be related to the effects of schooling, then this material was likely to have been incorporated. (The technical problems associated with this way of doing business are not our concern here.) Theory-WHW's theory-about what factors shape the impact of schooling then emerged from their meta-analysis of all this data. Of course, they also cross-checked their findings by getting the opinions of experts; but as most of these probably used the same atheoretical procedure in their own work (they are largely, after all, experts in what variables impact school learning), it is not entirely clear that using them constituted a nonconfounded source of enlightenment! But what precisely are the difficulties related to this way of generating theory and/or a "theoretical framework" and "systematic knowledge base" (Wang et al., 1993a)? There are several points to be made here.
Data and Theory Generation
The first point concerns the impoverished sense of "theory." In the natural sciences-where the production of theories has rightly been regarded as a crowning achievement-it has long been realized that theory cannot be produced merely by processing or generalizing from the available data. Theory goes beyond the data and accounts for it, and theory therefore cannot be generated mechanically from data. (The philosopher Charles S. Peirce coined the term abduction to describe the process of theory invention; together with Dewey and Popper and others, he recognized that generating theory is a creative rather than an algorithmic process. See Phillips, 1987, Part 1.) The kinetic theory of gases, for example, cannot be produced by generalizing from data about the measured values of such variables as pressure, volume, temperature, and the mass of a gas; neither can quantum theory or evolutionary theory or the theory of relativity be produced by either a process of generalization or some sort of mathematical analysis of bodies of data (see, for further discussion, Phillips, 1992, chap. 9). After all, if theories were producible in this way, Darwin, Einstein, and the rest would not be recognized as scientists of genius. In the words of the philosopher of science, Carl Hempel, Theories are usually introduced when previous study of a class of phenomena has revealed a system of uniformities that can be expressed in the form of empirical laws. Theories then seek to explain these regularities and, generally, to afford a deeper and more accurate understanding of the phenomena in question. To this end, a theory construes those phenomena as manifestations of entities and processes that lie beneath or behind them, as it were. (Hempel, 1966, p. 70) Seen in this light, WHW's claim that proximal variables are more influential than distal variables is not an illuminating theory. To suggest, as WHW do, that this conclusion is equivalent to a theoretical framework (albeit an emerging one) is rather like saying that Boyle's law, Charles' law, and the kinetic theory of gases could profitably be replaced by a statement such as: Pressure, volume, and temperature have more influence on the behavior of a gas than other variables that could be measured. This undoubtedly is true, but it is hardly an advanced or informative theory. It is simply a generalized statement of the findings of empirical research, and a relatively atheoretical statement at that.
Measurement Without Hypotheses Is Blind
The second issue raised by WHW's methodology is that abstracted empiricism (measuring the maximum number of things that are measureable and then seeing what turns up in various analyses) often is unlikely to lead to relevant insight. For measurement that is not guided by deep reflection on the nature of the object or phenomenon being measured is likely to miss its core features. Science does not usually progress by measuring all that can be measured but rather by reflection and experimentation directed at determining what ought to be measured and then devising ways to deal with these things. The procedure followed by WHW is reminiscent of the one advocated by Francis Bacon (1561-1626): Exhaustive ennumeration or collection of all possible facts takes place first and then is followed by a mechanical process of induction which will produce theories! This dream was eventually shattered by the realization that the facts researchers collect are largely determined by the things they look for, and what they look for is largely determined by the prior theories or models or hypotheses that they hold. (For a discussion and critique of Bacon's model of induction, see Phillips, 1987, Part 1.)
An Impoverished Model of Teaching and Learning
Teaching is a complex activity wherein a learner (hopefully) acquires physical and intellectual skills, information, theories, insight, a variety of levels of understanding, moral and ethical standards, and so forth. It is not clear that atheoretical measurement of variables can capture these things in a nontrivial way. Research on teaching, learning, and school success-like research on other complex matters-will be more to the point if it is undertaken on the basis of careful prior reflection, analysis, or theorizing about what ought to be studied.
The same point can be put another way: Jack Douglas, writing in a monograph on social research nearly two decades ago, stressed that it is a sound principle of research that the methods used in inquiry should be attuned to the (supposed) nature of the object of inquiry (Douglas, 1976) . WHW make it clear that they are not willing to bite the bullet about using some conception or model of teaching/ learning to guide their inquiries into the phenomenon they are researching. Indeed, they state explicitly that they were not guided by philosophies like behaviorism or pragmatism (Wang et al., 1993a) . However, positions like behaviorism and pragmatism-especially the work of Dewey in the latter category (see Democracy and Education, chap. 25, 1916/1944)-do offer coherent views of the phenomena that are of interest to WHW. The point is that some conception of what it is they are studying is required to give direction and point to WHW's endeavors. And, of course, a skeptic might argue that WHW in fact do have such a guiding conception-an unduly mechanistic model of teaching and schooling that most readily lends itself to the kind of investigation they have carried out.
What or How?
There is a final point to be made in this discussion of abstracted empiricism. Arguably, the key issue in research aimed at producing a knowledge base for teaching and schooling is not which variables to maximize but rather how the relevant variables ought to be or can be maximized. Consider the following example: It is intuitively obvious that, in general, a student who spends no time on task will learn very little. Thus the issue is not that teachers need metaanalysis to tell them that time on task has to be maximized. Rather, the issue is how to maximize time on task, given the conditions that teachers labor under! And in order to answer this question, some model or theory of the phenomenon needs to be used as a guide. Provisos, such as proximal variables are more closely related to effective schooling than distal ones, do not give help where help is needed. This point leads directly to our other major concern.
The Second Line of Criticism: The Oversimple Relation Between Theory and Practice/Policy It is arguable, then, that WHW have not established a knowledge base of schooling but rather offer denatured generalized empirical findings. The atheoretical character of WHW's conclusions suggests that the authors have a mistaken view, not only of the relationship between theory and data but also about the role that hypotheses, reflection, and philosophical commitments play in the generation of theoretical knowledge.
But let us suppose for a moment that WHW in fact had produced a theory. Does this mean that, as the authors claim, researchers would be in a position to easily derive guidance for educational practice? On WHW's account, theory drives practice: Research on research on schooling bears directly on schooling itself. Armed with findings that they regard as broad, significant, and confirmed by experts, WHW harbor no reservations in proclaiming what teachers should do. Their view is: The more solid the base of knowledge, the more assured researchers can be that reform will proceed on course.
A peculiar kind of logic informs this way of thinking. From statistical correlations, practices are inferred; the stronger the correlation, the more obvious the practice seems. Gary Fenstermacher has discussed the error here; he calls this slide in logic a kind of "triple play" (Fenstermacher, 1978) Psychological attitudes-particularly cognitive and metacognitive processescomprise the authors' first "key types of proximal variables" (Wang et al.,  1993a) . According to the data, the effect of these processes on student learning proves to be especially strong. WHW therefore conclude:
All of these psychological attributes are essential to the development of independent, self-regulated learners. Currently, many educational and psychological theorists conceive of learners as architects building their own knowledge structures, a conception that reflects the cognitive paradigm of learning now prominent in the social sciences. (1993a) As the authors themselves suggest, transforming findings about cognition into pedagogical practice entails far more than mastering specified techniques. A host of normative questions also must be negotiated. What is the meaning of independent? What does self-regulated mean? What assumptions about the role of tradition, authority, and community life do these constructs entail? Who, or what, guides or constrains the architects? Is it always desirable for learners to be independent? Might this value be counterproductive for certain kinds of students or in certain subject domains or social settings?
Variables concerning instruction pose similar questions. "When teachers engage students in social interactions," WHW (1993a) declare, "they can model appropriate behaviors, dissuade students from disruptive behavior, and establish a classroom atmosphere conducive to learning." But what exactly counts as "appropriate" or "disruptive" behavior, and under which conditions do these judgments hold? Who determines what is acceptable and what is deviant? Must students always conform to the teacher's model?
The final variable, home environment, is no less value laden. "In contrast to distal variables which are more removed from students' day-to-day lives, the home is central to students' daily experience," WHW (1993a) write. "Consequently, the home functions as the most salient out-of-school context for student learning, amplifying or diminishing the school's effect on learning" (Wang et al.,  1993a) . On the basis of this finding, WHW conclude that "teachers must ... develop strategies to increase parent involvement in their children's academic life" (WHW, 1993a, p. 25). Going beyond "traditional once-a-year parent/ teacher conferences" (WHW, 1993a) Questions such as these cannot be answered "correctly." Neither rules nor algorithms can remove contingency and doubt. The way we choose to respond to these questions is always an act of judgment; practice cannot be deemed wrong or right independent of purpose and context. This does not mean, however, that all choices are equally sound. Actions may be more or less appropriate, constructive, worthwhile. Opening up our decisions to critical scrutiny or challenge does not guarantee correctness, but it does increase the likelihood that assumptions will be acknowledged and that what Max Weber calls "inconvenient facts" (1918/1946, p. 147) will be exposed and confronted. Becoming conscious of deep assumptions, in turn, enhances the capacity for choice. And choice with respect to decision making carries with it increased responsibility.
The findings implicit in the present study thus do not-and logically cannotdictate practice. Rather, they suggest normative questions that must be negotiated socially. From Dewey we learn that the quality of deliberation depends on the quality of association that a community enjoys. The richer the communal interaction-the more diverse the experiences, values, and beliefs of the participants-the more likely it is that otherwise unrecognized assumptions will be brought to light (see Bernstein, 1985; Dewey, 1916 Dewey, /1944 Friess, 1950) . On this account of decision making, not only research experts but all interested parties-teachers, parents, policymakers, and perhaps the learners themselvesare potential partners in the conversation about policies and practices.
On the kind of model sketched above, settling practical questions is neither clean nor simple. With diversity comes both richness and potential conflict. Not only practice but the nature of educational conversation itself is put into question. How, exactly, might each party contribute to the debate? What constitutes authority and expertise in deliberations about aims, values, and practices in education? How can the insights of different groups be made available to others? How can access be assured? Who gains, and who loses?
This way of making decisions about educational practice challenges a network of assumptions held, not only by WHW but by many researchers, policymakers, and members of the public. Education, many of us want to believe, is apolitical: Something as precious as our children's future should not be sullied by partisan debate (Tyack & Hansot, 1981) . Conflict, moreover, is difficult to embrace. Lack of consensus seems to signal disarray; it suggests that progress is not being furthered but is rather being paralyzed (Kaestle, 1993) .
Recognizing, however, that there is no one right way to promote successful practice, it becomes incumbent on us to reassess these assumptions. And clearly, as we discuss these matters and try to forge educational policies and educational practices, our findings-the findings of researchers-must be taken into account. But rather than constituting a knowledge base that contains directives for practice, research findings serve as a resource-one resource among, perhaps, many that can be put to diverse uses by the various participants in the conversation about education.
